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## NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION CENTER POST OFFICE BOX 2821 WASHINGTON 13, D. C.

Copy 13 2 Pages 1 November 1961 NPIC/IM-38/61

THROUGH: TALENT Control Officer, CIA/ORR  ATTENTION:  DDI/GMTF  SUBJECT: USSR Rail Line Search for ICBM Activity  REFERENCES: (a) Requirement DDI/RR/E/R-43/61 (b) NPIC Project JN-284/61  1. This memorandum is in response to a request for a search of all rail lines in the USSR covered by photography from October 1961, for ICBM activity.  2. An earlier memorandum, NPIC/IM-32/61, dated 16 October 1961, established the criteria for the searches and reported the results of a search from previous KEYHOLE photography.  3. The present search produced no evidence of previously unreported ICBM activity and negated no additional mileage of Soviet broadgauge rail line.  4. All areas covered by Mission which had not been negated in regard to ICBM activity on the basis of photography taken within 6 months of the present mission were searched. The major reason that additional areas could not be negated on this search was that the photography was of poor quality and positive photo identification was difficult.  Declass Review by NIMA/DOD - 1 -		MEMORANDUM FO	R: Deputy Director (Intelligence), CIA	
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SECRET RUFF

HR70-14

## TOP SECRET RUFF

SUBJECT: USSR Rail Line Search for ICBM Activity

NPIC/IM-38/61

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Approximately 25 percent of the photography was cloud covered. Mission over the USSR. No overlays were prepared for this memorandum.

FOR THE DIRECTOR, NPIC

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Operations Officer

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NPIC/PAG

(1 November 1961)

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